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Recent Developments

Troxel v. Granville:
The Supreme Court Again Affirms the Fundamental Right to Parent
ByTraci Gladstone Corcoran

D

eaffmningacitizen's
ftfimdamental right to parent,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
state statute's application violated the
Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution in Troxel v. Granville,
120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). The
Supreme Court ruled that a statute
providing any third party the right to
petition the court for visitation, without
a showing ofharm or potential harm
to the children, was a violation of a
parent's fimdamental right to rear their
children. Id.
Tommie Granville (''Respondenf')
andBradTroxelhadt\\Uchildren together
out of wedlock; however, in 1993, Brad
Troxel committed suicide. Following the
death of the father, the paternal
grandparents, Jennifer and Gaiy Troxel,
("Petitioners) were originally granted
regular visits by the Respondent.
However, in October 1993, these visits
were limited in both frequency and
duration. Two months following the
visitation restrictions, Petitioners f:tled for
visitationinaWashingtonSuperiorCourt
under section 26.10.160(3) of the 1994
Washington Revised Code ("the statute'').
Id Section 26.1 0.160(3) provides:
"Any person may petition
the court for visitation rights
at any time including, but
not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court
may order visitation
rights for any person
when visitation may serve

the best interest of the
child whether or not there
has been any change in
circumstances."
In a 1995 oral ruling, the
Washington trial court ordered that the
Petitioners be granted visitation. The
Washington Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that a nonparent did
not have standing to seek visitation.
The Supreme Court ofWashington
affirmed the court of appeals on
different grounds, finding the statute
violated the U.S. Constitution. Upon
petition, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
In the plurality opinion, Justice
O'Connor, joined by the ChiefJustice,
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer,
held that the application ofthe statute
violated the Due Process Clause. !d.
at 2056. Their analysis began by
acknowledging that the traditional
American family is substantially
different today than it was in the past.
!d. at 2059. Most significant is that
28% percent ofminor children in the
United States reside in single parent
homes. !d. The Supreme Court
pointed out that as a result of the
alterations in the average family,
''persons outside the nuclear family are
called upon with increasing frequency
bassist in the everyday tasks of child
rearing." !d. Due to this societal shift
in child-rearing, statutory rights now
encompass "third party interests" in
a minor child. !d. The Supreme

Court went on to advise that these
types of statutes, enacted throughout
the country, have the potential to
place an enormous burden on "the
traditional parent-child relationship."
!d. Further, these statutes give rise
to constitutional questions as
presented in this case. !d.
Reviewing the 5th Amendment,
as incorporated to the states through
the 14th Amendment, Justice
0' Connor explained that substantive
due process, as discussed in

Washington

v.

Glucksberg,

"provides heightened protection
against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests." !d. at 2060 (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 719, 117 S.CT. 2258
(1997)). The fundamental liberty
interest of parents to care for and be
in control of their child was
established some 75 years ago. !d.
(Citing, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625
(1923) which held that parental rights
to "establish a home and bring up
children" and "to control the
education of their own" was
protected by the Due Process
Clause).
Relying heavily on precedent,
the Court reiterated that "it cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning
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the care, custody, and control of their
children." !d. at 2061. The Supreme
Court described the application of
the statute as "breathtakingly
broad" because it essentially gave
sole power to the judge in
determining the child's best
interest, while giving no deference
to parental opinions. !d. The statute
allowed the court to eliminate any
parental decision involving
visitation when a third party
petitions that court. !d.
Reaffirming the fundamental
right to parent, the plurality
examined the Washington statute.
ld. at 2061. The court put a great
amount of emphasis on the fact that
the Respondent had never been
deemed an unfit parent. Citing
precedent, the Supreme Court held
that "there is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of
their child." Id. (quoting Parham
v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1977)).
Specifically at issue was the
Supreme Court's concern with the
fact that no consideration was ever
given to what the Respondent
believed was in her children's best
interests. !d. at 2062. In fact, after
quoting the superior court judge
verbatim, the Supreme Court stated
that the judge presumed the
opposite. !d. The Court found that
the trial court never considered this
presumption of a right to parent, but
rather held that the child's best
interest would be served by them.
The trial court also did not address
the adverse impact, thereby failing
to protect the constitutional right of
the Respondent to make choices
concerning her children. Id. This
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further meant that the burden of
disproving "best interests" was placed
on the Respondent. !d.
The mother never sought to
completely
eliminate
the
grandparents' visitation. ld. at
2063. Rather, she sought only to
limit it to one visit per month and
"special holidays." Id. The Court
pointed out that even throughout the
various court proceedings, the
Respondent maintained her position
that her goal was not to do away
with visitation, but rather limit the
visits. Id. The superior court's
interpretation ofthe statute "gave no
weight to Granville's having
assented to visitation." !d.
Additionally, the Superior Court
did not even consider a settlement
"on middle ground." !d.
For the foregoing reasons, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of
parental rights when it held that the
Washington
statute
was
unconstitutional in its application.
!d. at 2064. The Supreme Court
declined the opportunity to consider
whether "all non-parental visitation
statutes" must require a showing of
harm in order to pass the test of
constitutionality in light of the Due
Process Clause. ld.
Justices Souter and Thomas
concurred in the judgment and both
agreed that the fundamental right of
parents to raise and nurture their
children is protected by the. Due
Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment. Id. at 2066, 2068.
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Kennedy dissented in the judgment.
!d. at 2068-2079. Justice Scalia
opined that raising children is an

"unalienable Right" granted by the
Declaration oflndependence. !d. at
2074. Justice Scalia further stated
that this right comes under the
purview of the 9th Amendment
which states that enumerated rights
granted by the Constitution "shall not
be construed to deny or disparage."
!d. According to Justice Scalia, no
power has been granted to him by
the Constitution "to deny legal effect
to laws that infringe upon what is
an unenumerated right." !d. Justice
Kennedy believed that this matter
should have been remanded because
the Supreme Court ofWashington
never addressed the "specific
visitation order the Troxels
obtained." Id. at 2079. Justice
Stevens believed that the Court should
have denied certiorari. !d.
There should be a required
threshold standard for proving harm
before an outsider can inject
themselves into another family. The
nuclear family is arguably no longer
the predominant model due to the
prevalence of divorce in our
society. The continued conflict
between family members makes it
vital that the fundamental right of
parents be protected. A showing of
harm or potential harm to a child
provides a state the constitutional
means for intervention within its
parens patriae function. The
Supreme Court has now acted on
behalf of fit parents throughout the
country, possibly halting the
devastating impact that broad third
party visitation statutes may have
on good and decent parents.
Maryland does not have a
statute as broad as the one at issue
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in this case. However, Maryland's
most applicable statute, section 9102 of the Family Law Article of
the Annotated Code of Maryland
lacks an explicit threshold standard.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's
decision in Troxel v. Granville may
very well impact the state directly.
Courts now must be conscientious
ofthis ruling and conduct themselves
accordingly. The Supreme Court
plurality opinion in Troxel is
unambiguous in its animus toward
courts and judges that neglect the
presumption that a parent acts in the
best interest of their child absent a
showing of harm or potential harm.
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